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1. Introduction
In myriad different settings, the theory of choice under uncertainty
poses the question: How does a decision maker evaluate marginal risks as
increments to an initial wealth endowment? In general, an individual's
willingness to accept an incremental monetary risk depends on its joint
distribution with stochastic initial wealth, as well as the individual's
attitudes of risk aversion and diversification preference.
This paper demonstrates that individual attitudes of risk aversion and
diversification preference are closely linked with the degree of smoothness
of the underlying preference relation over monetary risks, represented in
terms of the first and second variations of the preference functional in the
direction of incremental risks, evaluated at an initial portfolio.
Preferences are smooth to the first degree if the first variation of the
preference functional is a continuous linear form over incremental risks
which are mean-independent of initial wealth. They are smooth to the second
degree if, in addition, the second variation of the preference functional is
a continuous quadratic form over zero-mean, mean-independent risk increases.
These definitions of smoothness apply generally to any preference relation
over monetary risks, and not merely to expected utility preferences.
Under the maintained assumptions of continuity and monotonicity,
first-degree risk preference smoothness implies diversification preference,
which specifies that a small share of any mean-independent risk increment
having positive expected value is utility enhancing. Diversification
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preference is equivalent to the Arrow-Lind (1970) property that any small,
mean-independent risk increment is valued according to its expectation.
Under the same maintained assumptions, second-degree smoothness of risk
preference implies the existence of a generalized Arrow-Pratt index of risk
aversion. For risk preferences which exhibit second-degree smoothness, the
risk premium associated with any small, independent risk increment is
proportional to its variance.
The idea of preference smoothness permits a simple, unified treatment of
the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) in a perfectly competitive, finite asset
market. With general maintained assumptions about investor preferences,
first-degree preference smoothness yields the "exact" version of the APT, and
second-degree preference smoothness yields an "approximate" version. Thus,
the "exact" APT derives essentially from global diversification preference
among investors plus aggregate diversifiability of the market portfolio. The
stronger, "approximate" version of the APT applies if investor preferences
support an Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion, which permits a variance-based
asymptotic bound for deviations of equilibrium asset prices from those
predicted by the "exact" APT in a market that is not aggregately diversified.
2. Preliminaries
Monetary risks are identified with the vector space D of bounded random
variables defined on a probability space (fi,?,?>), for which f is an atomless
probability measure. The distribution function for a monetary risk x:EHR is
F~(x) = ^(x<x). Among monetary risks, x strictly dominates y stochastically
to the first degree, denoted x > y, if F~(z)<F~(z) for all z and
F~(z )<F~(z ) for some z . Equivalently, x >* y if E(g(x)) > E(g(y)) for
x o y o o
every strictly increasing function g:R->fR (Brumelle and Vickson, 1975).
- 3 -
Any preference relation V:D-HR is assumed to be complete and transitive.
In subsequent discussion, I will also invoke the following basic properties:
Continuity: V(y) -• V(x) whenever y -*• x in distribution.
Monotonicity: V(y) > V(x) whenever y > x.
Convexity: If V(x) > V(x+y) then V(x+ey) > V(x+y) for all ee(0,l).
Pseudo-Convexity: If V(x) >(>) V(x+y) then V(x) >(>) V(x+ey) for all e>l.
Continuity in distribution means that the preference relation V is
indifferent among identically distributed monetary risks. Thus, continuous
(in distribution) preferences are state-independent in the sense that they
depend only on distributions of final payoffs, but not on the states of
nature in which these payoffs occur. Monotonicity is the condition that
"more is preferred to less"; while convexity implies that averages are
preferred to extremes. Pseudo-convexity (a condition distinct from
convexity) simply says that if a given incremental risk is distasteful, then
larger portions of the same risk are likewise distasteful.
I next present standard definitions of risk aversion and diversification
preference. Hereafter, I adopt the convention that m e D represents
stochastic initial wealth, while x G D is an incremental monetary risk.
I(m) c D is the set of monetary risks that are stochastically independent of
initial wealth m, while MI(m) c D is the set of monetary risks that are
mean-independent of m: MI(m) = {xeD: E(x|m) = 0}. ZI(m) and ZMI(m) indicate
the subsets of zero-mean monetary risks that are, respectively, independent
and mean-independent of m: ZI(m) = (xGl(m): E(x) = 0} and
ZMI(in) = {xeMI(m): E(x) = 0). Notice that MI(m) and ZMI(m) are vector
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spaces, but that I(m) and ZI(m) in general are not because stochastic
independence is not preserved under addition. However, completion of I(m) as
a vector space in D with respect to convergence in distribution yields
exactly MI(m) (Chew and Herk, 1995).
Definition. The preference relation V on D shows aversion to independent
increases in risk if V(m+x) < V(m) for all meD and xel(m) with E(x)<0.
Likewise, V shows aversion to mean-preserving increases in risk if the same
condition applies for all xeMI(m) with E(x)<0.
Definition. The preference relation V on D shows diversification preference
if for all meD and xeMI(m) with E(x)>0, there exists e >0 such that
V(m + ex)) > V(m) for all e<e*.
Throughout the paper, I will maintain the assumptions that risk
preferences are continuous, monotone, and averse to independent risk
increases. Hereafter, a standard preference relation V on D is one which
exhibits these properties. Note that a standard preference relation is not
necessarily either convex or pseudo-convex, nor does it necessarily exhibit
diversification preference.
Further aspects of individual preference with respect to small risk
increments are expressed in terms of the first and second variations of the
preference relation V. My usage of this terminology exactly follows standard
definitions from the calculus of variations. The first variation of V at
initial wealth m in the direction of the incremental risk x is
SV~(x) = d/de V(m+ex)I +.
m ' 'O
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Similarly, the second variation of V at m in the direction x is
« V ( x ) = d2/de2 V(m+ex)| +.
m 0
The first variation 5V~(-) can also be referred to naturally as the marginal
m
utility of incremental risk at stochastic initial wealth m.
Definition. The utility functional V on D is smooth to the first degree if
for all xeD, 5V (X) is continuous, and for all meD, 6V~ (•) is a continuous
( ' ) m
2linear functional on MI(m).
Definition. The utility functional V on D is smooth to the second degree if
it is smooth to the first degree; and for all meD, 8 V-(-) is a continuous
m
quadratic functional on ZMI(m).
In the preceding definitions, smoothness of the preference relation V to
either the first or second degree is understood to imply that the associated
directional derivatives exist. Notice that first-degree smoothness refers to
the behavior of 5V~ over incremental risks which are mean-independent of
m
initial wealth m; whereas second-degree smoothness refers to the behavior of




First-degree smoothness of a standard preference relation V implies that
the first variation 6V~(x) is proportional to E(x) for any incremental risk x
m
which is mean-independent of initial wealth m. This in turn implies
diversification preference. The following theorem states these results in
global terms.
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Theorem 1. Let V be a standard preference relation on D. If V is smooth to
the first degree, then:
(i) 6V~(x) - 5V~(l)E(x) for all meD and xeMI(m).
m m
(ii) V exhibits diversification preference.
Proof. See Chew and Herk (1995). 3
In Theorem l(i), 5V~(1) is the marginal utility of income evaluated at
m
stochastic initial wealth m.
If V is a standard preference relation on D which is pseudo-convex, then
first-degree smoothness also implies aversion toward all mean-independent
increases in risk (Chew and Herk, 1995).
The next theorem is a counterpart to Theorem 1. Second-degree
smoothness of a standard preference relation V on D implies that the second
variation 6 V~(x) is proportional to E(x ) for any zero-mean, incremental
m
risk x which is independent of initial wealth m.
Theorem 2. Let V be a standard preference relation on D. If V is smooth to
the second degree, then 6 v~(x) = 8 V~(l~)E(x ) for all xeZI(m), where 1-
denotes any risk in ZI(m) for which E(l~ ) = 1.
m
Proof: Let V:EHR be a standard preference relation that is smooth to the
second degree. Notice that D is a subspace of £ (Q,^,T). By the Riesz
2





for all xeZMI(m). Since V is state-independent, g~ admits the representation
m
g~(o;) = g(m(w)) for some measurable function g:R-»iR. Consequently,
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6V(x) - E[g(m)]E(x2) for xeZI(m).
m
Let 1~ be any monetary risk in ZI(m) for which E(l~ ) = 1. Substituting
m m
1~ for x in the expression for 8 V~(x) establishes that E[g(m)] = 5 V~(l~),
m m m m
from which the theorem follows. Q.E.D.
The certainty equivalent CE~(x) e IR is the nonstochastic increment to
m
initial wealth m which is indifferent to the incremental risk x. It is
defined by
V(m + x) - V(m + CE-(x)) . (1)
m
Equation (1) has a unique solution because monotonicity of V implies
nonsatiation. The certainty equivalent CE~ is itself a utility function on D
which expresses the same preferences as V, subject to the normalization
CE-(c) = c for every scalar c. Consequently, CE- inherits all of V's
m m
properties with respect to continuity, monotonicity, convexity,
pseudo-convexity, risk aversion, and diversification preference. The
following elementary lemma shows that CE~ also inherits V's properties of
m
smoothness.
Lemma 1. Let V be a standard preference relation on D.
(i) If V is smooth to the first degree, then so is CE~ for any meD, and
m
5CE~(x) = 5V~(x)/5V~(l) = E(x) for all xeMI(m).
m m m
(ii) If V is smooth to the second degree, then so is CE~ for any meD, and
m
52CE~(x) = S2V~(x)/5V~(l) = [$V(i~)/SV~(l)]E(x2) for all xeZI(m).
m m m ro m m
Proof: Differentiating both sides of (1) yields
5CE~(x) = 5V-(x)/5V~(l) .
m m m
Differentiating a second time yields
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62V-(x) - 62V-(l)(5CE-(x))2
52CE~(x) = - - - .
tfV-(l)
m
The lemma is proved by substituting in both expressions according to Theorems
1 and 2. Q.E.D.
Taken together, Theorem 1 and Lemma l(i) show that first-degree
smoothness of a standard preference relation implies that for all meD and
xeMI (in) ,
CE~(ex) = E(x)e + o( e), (2)
m
where o(e) indicates a residual that goes to zero faster than e. Equation
(2) is precisely the Arrow-Lind (1970) property, which says that any small,
mean-independent risk increment added to initial wealth is valued according
to its expectation. The Arrow-Lind property implies diversification
preference; in fact, both properties are equivalent for any standard
preference relation V for which 6V~ is continuous (see footnote 3).
m
Theorem 2 with Lemma l(ii) yields a companion result: Second-degree
smoothness of a standard preference relation implies that the certainty
equivalent of any independent risk increment has a second-order Taylor
expansion in which the first-order term is the expected value of the
incremental risk and the second-order term is proportional to its variance.
This result is stated formally in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let V be a standard preference relation on D. If V is smooth to
the second degree, then for all meD and xGl(m),
CE~(ex) = E(x)e - p~ var(x)(e2/2) + o(e2) , (3)
m m
where p~ = - (52V~(l-)/5V~(1)).
m m m m
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Proof. From (1), it follows directly that
CE~(ex) - E(x)e + CE- ~ (e[x-E(x)]).
m m+€E(x) L J
It is necessary to show that the approximation for CE- - (e[x-E(x)]) as a
second-order Taylor series has the desired form. Observe that
d/de CE- - (e[x-E(x)])| + = d/de CE- (e [x-E(x) ] ) I +
' m+eE(x) l / W | 0 ' m L J '0
+ d/de CE~ - (0)1+ .
' m+€E(x ) '0
Since CE- ~ (0) = 0 for all e,
m+£E(x)
d/de CE~+€E(;;)(£[x-E(x)])|o+ = d/de CE~ (e [x-E(x) ] ) | Q+ = 0 ,
and also
d2/de2 CE- - (e[x-E(x)])|
 + = d'/de2 CE~(e[x-E(x)])| +
m+etitx; 0 m 0
= [52V~(l~)/5V~(l)]var(x) ,
m m tn
where the second equalities in both instances rely on Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
In the Taylor expansion (3) of CE-(ex), the second-order coefficient
tn
p~ = -(5 V-(l-)/5V-(l)) is simply a generalized Arrow-Pratt index of risk
m m m m
aversion. For example, for expected utility preferences, V(z) = E(u(z)) with
u(-) e C2(R), 5V~(1) = E(u'(m)) and 52V~(1 ) = E(u"(m)). This yields the
in mm
familiar result that under expected utility, the Arrow-Pratt index of risk
aversion at initial wealth m is simply p~ = -E(u"(m))/E(u' (m)). In essence,
m
Theorem 3 shows that there exists an Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion for
any standard preference relation that is smooth to the second degree.
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4. Application: Arbitrage Pricing Theory
4.1. Basic Structure
In the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), originated by Ross (1976) and
generalized by Connor (1984), Chamberlain (1988), and Milne (1988), among
others, prices of financial assets are determined by projecting their
stochastic end-of-period values onto a limited set of stochastic factors.
The residual from this projection is an idiosyncratic risk whose price is
either zero in "exact" versions of the APT such as those cited above, or
bounded (and asymptotically negligible) in "approximate" versions (Dybvig,
1983; Grinblatt and Titman, 1983). In either its "exact" or "approximate"
variants, the power of the APT depends essentially on its ability to estimate
closely the equilibrium prices of idiosyncratic risks in perfectly
competitive but incomplete asset markets.
In this section, I present a streamlined model of a finite asset
exchange economy conforming to standard structural assumptions of the APT.
Within this framework, I show that the "exact" APT follows from first-degree
preference smoothness (diversification preference) among investors, while the
stronger "approximate" APT obtains if investor preferences are smooth to the
second degree.
As elsewhere in the paper, financial assets are identified with elements
of D, the vector space of bounded monetary risks defined on a probability
space ({!,%,?), where f is an atomless probability measure.
Consider a pure exchange economy which trades portfolios constituted
from a finite collection of elementary assets {z ,z ,...,z } under conditions
of perfect competition. The set of tradable portfolios is T = [z ] _ n D,
the linear manifold generated from the elementary assets and restricted to D.
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Asset portfolios are traded among a finite number of consumers, each of
whom has standard preferences over D which are also convex and pseudo-
4 ~i
convex. The ith consumer has an initial asset endowment a eT, from which
the aggregate endowment of the exchange economy is ^ a eT.
The structure of the asset exchange economy described above closely
follows Milne (1988), who proves the following fundamental results:
(1) There exists a competitive equilibrium for the asset exchange
economy with equilibrium pricing functional 7r:T-HR.
(2) Letting z £ T denote the equilibrium portfolio of consumer i, the
competitive equilibrium allocation of asset holdings {z1} over all consumers
constitutes a Pareto optimum relative to the aggregate endowment £ a .
(3) As a consequence of Pareto optimality, the equilibrium pricing
functional n is additive on T (there are no arbitrage opportunities).
For simplicity, I assume that asset 0 is riskless, with T(z =1) = 1.
The risk-free asset may be treated as a numeraire by means of the
(inessential) normalization 7r(z ) = 1. With this normalization, traded
assets can be regarded as "pure" risks, from which the element of time
relating to a holding period has been entirely removed.
4.2 "Exact" and "Approximate" Versions of the APT
The APT with a finite number of traded assets imposes several additional
assumptions concerning the structure of asset values.
Assumption (Factor Structure). Every elementary traded asset z ,
j
j=l,...,t obeys the factor structure
z. = E(z.) + 0 7 + ... + 0 7 + I. ,
J j jl 1 jK K j
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where {7 7 } c D is a collection of common factors, ft ,...,/? are
I K j 1 jK
factor sensitivities of the jth elementary asset's end-of-period value, and
I eD is an idiosyncratic risk specific to the jth elementary asset.
By construction, each factor and elementary idiosyncratic risk has zero
expected value. In the following, I refer to the linear manifolds generated
from the factors and elementary idiosyncratic risks as F = [7 ] _ n D and
I = [?.]' . n D.
I
Assumption (Independent Idiosyncratic Risks). Elementary idiosyncratic
risks {f ,... f } are jointly independent of the factors {7 ,...,7 } .
It I K
(Equivalently, every element of the factor space F is independent of every
element of the idiosyncratic space I.)
Any tradeable portfolio zeT may be separated into components from the
factor and idiosycratic spaces via z = m + f, with meF and |el. Because of
risk aversion, every consumer prefers a diversified portfolio meF to an
undiversified portfolio m + | which incorporates some nonzero element of
idiosyncratic risk |el.
Assumption (Individual Diversifiability). There is a tradeable
portfolio corresponding to each factor: {7 ,...,7 } c T.
1 K
Individual diversifiability implies FCT and hence ICT. Thus, any
element of the factor space F added to any element of the idiosyncratic space
I yields a tradeable portfolio, whence T = F © I.
The following assumption is optional in the sense that it is imposed in
"exact" APT and waived in the "approximate" APT.
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Assumption (Aggregate Diversifiability). The aggregate asset endowment
is diversified: £ a G F.
Theorems 4 and 5 present "exact" and "approximate" versions of the APT.
The "exact" APT proceeds from the assumption that the aggregate asset
endowment is diversified. If consumers are diversifiers (exhibit
first-degree preference smoothness), then in a competitive equilibrium, every
consumer holds a diversified portfolio and the price of every idiosyncratic
risk is zero. The "approximate" APT assumes that the aggregate asset
endowment is not diversified: that is, there exists a positive net supply of
(undiversified) idiosyncratic risk. If consumers exhibit second-degree
preference smoothness, then in a competitive equilibrium, every consumer
holds a positive amount of idiosyncratic risk and the price of any small
idiosyncratic risk is bounded away from zero in proportion to its covariance
with consumers' equilibrium portfolios.
Theorems 4 and 5 maintain the assumptions that consumers' risk
preferences are continuous, monotonic, convex and pseudo-convex, and averse
to independent risk increases.
Theorem 4. ("Exact" APT) Suppose that the aggregate asset endowment is
diversified. If consumers' risk preferences are smooth to the first degree,
then in a competitive equilibrium:
(i) For every consumer i, z^F.
(ii) For all fel, w(|) = 0.
Proof: Observe that for any risk zeT, (z - ?r(z)) e T is self-financing. As
in Chen and Ingersoll (1983), (ii) will be true if at least one consumer
holds a diversified portfolio. At this consumer's optimal portfolio z^F, it
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must be true that 5CE~i(| - TT(|)) - 0; since otherwise this consumer is not
z
satiated at z1 with respect to the incremental risk (f - T T ( O ) . Since this
incremental risk is mean-independent of z , first-degree preference
smoothness implies 5CE~i[| - TT(|)] = -TT(|) , whence TT(|) = 0.
z
It remains, therefore, to prove (i). Recall that aversion to indepedent
risk increases together with first-degree preference smoothness imply
aversion to mean-independent risk increases. Suppose to the contrary that a
certain consumer i holds an undiversified equilibrium portfolio z = m + £
for which m EF, £ el, and £ ?* 0. Since aggregate diversification of the
market portfolio implies £ £ = 0 , consumer i's undiversified portfolio is
inconsistent with Pareto optimality. (See Milne (1988), Lemma 7). Q.E.D.
Theorem 5. ("Approximate" APT) Suppose that the aggregate asset endowment
is not diversified. If consumers' risk preferences are smooth to the second
degree, then in a competitive equilibrium:
(i) For every consumer i, z = m + e £ , with m eF, £ eI\{0} and e >0.
(ii) For all |el, 7r(f) = -p~i cov^1,!) + ^(e1), where p~i is the
m m
m
Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion for consumer i evaluated at m1, and
r(e1) is a remainder for which r(e )->0 as e ->0.
Proof: Part (i) follows from the same arguments used to prove Theorem 4. If
to the contrary some consumer holds a diversified portfolio in equilibrium,
then ?r(£) = 0 for all |el, and hence every consumer holds a diversified
equilibrium portfolio. But this is impossible because the aggregate
endowment is not diversified.
Part (ii) may be proved as follows. In a competitive equilibrium,
suppose that consumer i with preference relation V chooses the optimal
- 15 -
portfolio z1= m1 + e1^1, where n^eF, ^GINJO} and e^O. For any fel and
, e1!1 + tff e I. According to Theorem 3,
var(f X e 1 ) 2 + var(f)fl2 + 2cov(?\f) e
where p~i = -5 V~i(l~i)/5V~i(l) is the Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion for
in m in m
consumer i evaluated at the diversified component m1 of the consumer's
«j i
equilibrium portfolio z , and r(e ,0) is a remainder. Differentiating both
sides of this expression with respect to # at zero gives
1!1 ? f fSOe1 + rCe1) , (4)
with r(e ) = d/d'd r(e ,0). Because z is an optimal portfolio, (4) equals
zero for every |el for which TT(|) = 0. Therefore, replacing |el by
(I " *•(£)) in (4) and rearranging terms yields
TT(|) = -p-i cov(|\|) + rCe1) .
m
It remains to show that r(e1)^-0 as e^O. First, observe that for any
m,x,z e D and e,# > 0, V(m + CE~(ex + #z)) = V(m + ex + CE- ~
m m+e x
Consequently,
SV-(l) a/ao CE-(ex + «z)I + = 6V~ ~(1) 5CE- -(z),
m ' m '0 m+€x m+ex v
and




The last pair of equalities relies on the continuity of 5V (y) (and hence
also of 5CE (y)) for any given yeD.
Applying (5) to (4) establishes that
lim r(e ) = lim 5CE~i(J) - E(f) = 0
eW €10
for all fel. Q.E.D.
Remarks: (1) The proof of "exact" APT (Theorem 4) remains valid even if the
elementary idiosyncratic risks f , j=l t, are individually independent
J
(or even mean-independent) of the factors {7 ,...,7 }. This weaker
assumption is enough to insure that every idiosyncratic risk is
mean-independent of every diversified portfolio. Geanokoplos and Oh (1991)
prove the "exact" APT with mean-independent idiosyncratic risks. However,
the "approximate" APT (Theorem 5) requires the stronger assumption that
elementary idiosyncratic risks are jointly independent of the factors, which
implies that idiosyncratic risks are independent of diversified portfolios.
(2) The pricing equation in the "approximate" APT is reminiscent of
the security market line in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). In the
"approximate" APT, the equilibrium price of an arbitrary idiosyncratic risk
is approximated according to its correlation with idiosyncratic risks
actually held in consumers' equilibrium portfolios.
(3) Grinblatt and Titman (1983) prove a version of the "approximate"
APT like that in Theorem 5, but under more restrictive assumptions. In
particular, they assume that consumers have expected utility preferences, and
that elementary idiosyncratic risks are jointly independent of each other as
well as the factors.
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Notes
1. Convexity and psuedo-convexity play no role in the theorems of this
section concerning preference smoothness, and hence do not appear in my
definition of standard preferences. I have enumerated these properties
together with other basic preference assumptions because they will be
important in the derivation of the APT in Section 4.
2. First-degree preference smoothness imposes stronger conditions than
those in Chew and Herk (1995), where 6V~(x) is assumed to be continuous
m
with respect to the incremental risk x, but not necessarily with respect
to initial wealth m.
3. Chew and Herk prove that if 5V~(-) exists and is continuous on D, then
m
conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent to each other, and also to first-
degree smoothness of V.
4. Thus, each consumer's risk preferences are continuous, monotonic, convex
and pseudo-convex, and averse to independent risk increases.
5. On the significance of joint independence of the factors and elementary
idiosyncratic risks, see Remark (1) following the proof of Theorem 5.
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